




ince the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), it has been
understood that policymaking under discretion can lead to a substan-
tially worse outcome than policymaking under commitment. Many
economists believe that discretionary policymaking is important for under-
standing central issues in monetary policy1 and ﬁscal policy.2 Although there
are now many different models of discretionary policymaking, there are two
common and essential aspects in all models: (i) private agents make current
choices that affect the evolution of state variables on the basis of beliefs about
future policy, and (ii) future policymakers take these state variables as his-
torically determined when choosing their optimal actions. Further, within the
models of this large literature, there is typically a cost arising from the fact
that the discretionary policymaker cannot manage expectations, so that the
resulting equilibrium is inefﬁcient relative to that arising with a committed
policymaker.
Another potential impact of discretion, however, is that more than one
equilibrium may result from the central interaction between private sector
choice of state variables, private sector beliefs about future policy, and future
policy reaction to state variables. Some of these discretionary equilibria are
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1 For example, a discretionary monetary policymaker may produce a positive rate of inﬂation
in an economy while a committed policymaker would produce a zero rate of inﬂation (see Kydland
and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983).
2 For example, a discretionary ﬁscal policymaker may eliminate private incentives for socially
beneﬁcial accumulation by taxing all capital income every period (see Fischer 1980), while a
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all (see Chamley 1986).
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better than others in terms of the welfare of the members of the society. An
economy may get stuck in a relatively bad equilibrium, so that there can be
even greater costs of policy discretion.
Recent work on discretionary monetary policy by King and Wolman
(2004) shows how dynamic multiple equilibria can arise in a simple “plain
vanilla” New Keynesian macroeconomic model of monopolistic competition
andstickypricesofthevarietythatisnowstandardinmacroeconomicresearch
andpolicyanalysis. Inthatcontext, adiscretionarymonetaryauthorityadopts
a policy rule that fosters strategic complementarity between the actions of
pricesetters. In turn, that strategic complementarity makes for dynamic mul-
tiple equilibria, as in a large literature on the boundary of game theory and
macroeconomics concerning coordination games in aggregate economies.3
In the terminology of Cooper and John (1988), the standard New Keynesian
model can give rise to a “coordination failure.”
The objective of this article is to construct a very simple and transpar-
ent real model in which dynamic multiple equilibria are a consequence of
discretionary policymaking for the same economic reasons as in the mone-
tary policy literature. The model is inspired by a brief discussion in Kydland
and Prescott (1977) about the interaction of individual location decisions and
policy response to disasters such as ﬂoods:
The issues [of time inconsistency arise] in many well-known problems
of public policy. For example, suppose the socially desirable outcome is
not to have houses built in a particular ﬂoodplain but, given that they are
there, to take certain costly ﬂood-control measures. If the government’s
policy were not to build the dams and levees needed for ﬂood protection
and agents knew this was the case, even if houses were built there,
rational agents would not live in the ﬂood plains. But the rational agent
knows that, if he and others build houses there, the government will take
the necessary ﬂood-control measures. Consequently, in the absence of a
law prohibiting the construction of houses in the ﬂoodplain, houses are
built there, and the army corps of engineers subsequently builds the dams
and levees. (Kydland and Prescott, “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy 85: 477)
3 Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (2000) describe “expectation trap equilibria” within a
monetary policy setting. In these situations, a monetary authority optimally responds to the beliefs
of the private sector in ways that are self-conﬁrming so that there is a thematic resemblance to the
discussion of the main text. However, the expectation trap equilibria studied by these authors are
members of a set of “sustainable plan equilibria” in which great latitude is given to expectation
formation and, in essence, a summary of beliefs operates as a state variable. For this class of
equilibria to exist, it is necessary that there be no known endpoint to the economy. By contrast,
the equilibria described in King and Wolman (2004) are multiple Markov-perfect equilibria in the
language of game theory, arising even when there is a ﬁxed endpoint to the dynamic game (as
in the example in this article, where the game is essentially static).R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 3
The essence of the situation just described is that there is a strategic inter-
actionbetweentheprivatesectorandthegovernment. Accordingly, following
muchrecentliteratureonpolicymakingunderdiscretionandcommitment, we
will make use of game-theoretic constructs to discuss the interaction between
private location decisions and the government dam-building decision.
In their analysis, Kydland and Prescott were concerned with understand-
ing the nature of a single discretionary equilibrium and why it would be worse
than a single commitment equilibrium. By contrast, this article shows how
policy discretion fosters strategic complementarity among private sector de-
cisionmakers in ways that lead to multiple equilibria. In the example studied
below,however,themechanismsareexactlythosehighlightedinthequotation
from their work. An individual knows that the discretionary government will
choose not to build a dam if there are only a small number of residents on the
ﬂoodplain, so that one equilibrium involves the efﬁcient outcome in which no
individuals live on the plain and no dam is built. Yet, an individual also knows
that the discretionary government will choose to build a dam if there are a
large number of ﬂoodplain residents, he thus ﬁnds it in his interest to locate
on the ﬂoodplain if a dam is built. Hence, there is another equilibrium that
involves a socially inefﬁcient building of a dam and location of individuals
on the ﬂoodplain. In terms of game theory, it is well understood that multiple
equilibria arise when there is sufﬁcient strategic complementarity in a coor-
dination game (Schelling 1960 and Cooper 1999). In the example studied
in this article, the strategic complementarity is that an individual’s rewards
to locating on the plain are higher when other individuals choose to locate
there. But the strategic complementarity is present in this setting only when
policymaking is discretionary.
1. THE MODEL
There are two locations of economic activity: the ﬂoodplain and elsewhere.
There are two sets of actors: a government and a private sector. To highlight
aspects of the interactions between the government and the private sector, we
begin by studying a situation in which there is just one member of the private
sector (in Section 2) and then move to the more realistic case in which there
are many individuals (in Section 3).
The government and the members of the private sector each have a single
action. Theprivatesectormustdecidetoliveontheﬂoodplain(callthisaction
p = 1) or elsewhere (p = 0). The government must decide whether to build a
dam(d = 1)ornot(d = 0). Despitethefactpublicandprivatedecisionmakers
take different actions (d and p, respectively), the government’s objective is
to maximize the welfare of its citizens so that there is no intrinsic conﬂict
betweenthepublicsectorandprivatesector. Further,ifthegovernmentbuilds4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the dam, it ﬁnances construction via lump-sum taxation, with each member
of the private sector paying the same level of taxes.4
Individuals derive utility from their location and their consumption of
goods. Their utility function takes the form
u(c + bp) (1)
with b>0. That is, if an individual lives on the ﬂoodplain, then it is as if
his consumption is raised by an amount, b. Consumption is constrained by
after-tax income, which can take on several different values depending on the
actions of the government and private sector. The dependence of after-tax
income on private and public actions is displayed in Figure 1. The reference
level of income is y. If the government builds a dam at cost ψ and ﬁnances it
with lump-sum taxation, then after-tax income is y − ψ. If the government
does not build a dam and individuals choose to live on the plain then income
is f, which is assumed to be substantially less than y because of ﬂoods.
Next, consider the utility level that a single individual receives as it de-
pends on his location decision and the dam-building decision of the govern-
ment. The various possibilities are shown in Figure 2. We make the following
assumptions on the relative sizes of y,b, f, and ψ.
First,weassumethatthebestsituation—thesociallyoptimalsituation—is
one where individuals do not live on the ﬂoodplain and the dam is not built,
which requires a pair of restrictions on the parameters of the model. First, it
requires that y>f+b, which is the idea that effective income is lower when
one lives on the plain. Second, it requires that y>y+b−ψ or, equivalently,
that ψ>b : the dam’s cost is higher than the value of living on the ﬂoodplain.
Second,weassumethatthedamisproductiveinthesensethaty−ψ>f.
That is, if all individuals are constrained to live on the plain, then there is an
economic beneﬁt to building a dam to avoid the low output, f, which arises
because of ﬂoods.
These assumptions mean that it is easy to determine the optimal choice
for an individual. First, if he knows that the government will not build the
dam, then it is best for him not to locate on the ﬂoodplain since y>f+ b.
Second, if he knows that the government will build the dam, then it is best for
him to locate on the ﬂoodplain because there are positive beneﬁts from that
location choice (b>0 implies that b + y − ψ>y− ψ).
Similarly, the optimal choice for the government is easy to describe. As
discussed above, the government seeks to maximize the welfare of the indi-
vidual. If the government knows that the private agent will not locate on the
plain, then it is best not to build a dam since it is costly. If the government
knows that the private agent will locate on the plain, then it is best to build the
dam since it is a productive way of avoiding losses due to ﬂoods (y−ψ>f).
4 The Appendix considers the sensitivity of the core results to some alternative ﬁnancing rules.R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 5
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Notes: The possible government actions are to build a dam (d=1) or not (d=0). The
possible individual actions are to locate on the ﬂoodplain (p=1) or not (p=0). The income
resulting from these actions is given by the entry in the relevant cell of the matrix. For
example, if the individual locates on the plain and the government does not build the
dam, then the individual receives income “f.”
2. A TWO-PERSON GAME
We start by exploring the strategic interactions between a single individual
and the government, considering three different cases. First, we assume that
the private sector and the government act simultaneously. Second, we sup-
pose that the government acts ﬁrst, which corresponds to policymaking under
commitment. Third, we suppose that the private individual acts ﬁrst, which
corresponds to policymaking under discretion.
SimultaneousActions
Nash(1951)proposedadeﬁnitionofequilibriumingamessuchasthefollow-
ing: a pair of actions (p, d) is an equilibrium if p is the private sector’s best6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Notes: The possible government actions are to build a dam (d=1) or not (d=0). The
possible individual actions are to locate on the ﬂoodplain (p=1) or not (p=0). The utility
resulting from these actions is given by the entry in the relevant cell of the matrix. For
example, if the individual locates on the plain and the government does not build the
dam, then the individual receives income “f” and utility u(f+b), with “b” measuring the
beneﬁts to living on the ﬂoodplain.
The model assumes that the dam is costly ( >0); that there are beneﬁts to living on
the plain (b>0); that there are costs of living on the plain if there is no dam (y>f+b);
and that the dam is productive if individuals must live on the plain (y+b- >f+b). These
assumptions imply that the diagonal elements of the matrix B are dominant.
response to the action, d,by the government and if d is the government’s best
response to the private sectors’s action, p.5
There are, therefore, two Nash equilibria when the private individual and
the government move simultaneously. One is that the individual does not
locate on the plain and no dam is built by the government (p = 0,d= 0).
The other is that the individual locates on the plain and a dam is built by the
government (p = 1,d= 1). Each of these outcomes is an equilibrium in the
5Attention is restricted here to individuals choosing one action or the other. Mixed strategies
in which individuals choose one or the other with a speciﬁed probability are not considered.R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 7
Nash sense since it is optimal for (a) the individual to choose p = 0i fd = 0
and to choose p = 1i fd = 1, and (b) the government to choose d = 0i f
p = 0 and d = 1i fp = 1. One can verify the ﬁrst of these equilibria by
looking at Figure 2. For example, starting at the welfare level corresponding
to d = 0, p = 0, one can see that the individual gets lower welfare if he
chooses p = 1 (since f<y ), and that the government’s outcome is worse
if it chooses d = 1 (since y − ψ<y ). Proceeding similarly, one can also
conﬁrm that both diagonal elements are equilibria and that the off-diagonal
elements are not.
The two equilibria yield different welfare levels for the individual: the
beneﬁt from living on the ﬂoodplain is not as large as the cost of building
the dam, so that the p = 0, d = 0 equilibrium is unambiguously better than
the p = 1, d = 1 equilibrium. In terms of the literature on game theory,
this is an example of a coordination game, and at least since since Schilling
(1960), it has been known that coordination games can display more than one
equilibrium.
A Dominant Government
There is symmetry between the individual and the government in the situation
just discussed, with each agent deciding on an optimal action taking as given
the action of the other. An alternative situation is that the government is
dominant, choosing its best action knowing how the individual will respond
to government intervention. In our case, the government looks at the various
scenarios and recognizes that the individual will respond with p = 0 if the
government action is d = 0 and that the individual will respond with p = 1
if the government action is d = 1. Since welfare is higher when d = 0 and
p = 0 than when d = 1 and p = 1, the government will choose not to build
the dam.
This situation can be described in other ways. One is to say that the
government has a ﬁrst mover advantage, selecting its action and seeing a
subsequent response from the private sector, which stresses the timing of
actions. The second is to say that the government can credibly commit to take
the action d = 0 even if the private sector chooses p = 1, which stresses
aspects of feasible government strategies. Either of these perspectives limits
the equilibrium solely to the optimal one.
A Dominant Individual
We next consider a setting in which the private sector is dominant. In the
current setting, the individual knows that if he chooses p = 0 then the gov-
ernment will choose d = 0. He also knows that if he chooses p = 1 then the
government will choose d = 1. Since the individual’s welfare is highest with8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
p = 0 and d = 0, he will choose that action. Hence, a dominant individual
willalsobringaboutasociallyoptimaloutcome. Thatis, thefactthatthegov-
ernment cannot commit does not lead to multiple equilibria or to inefﬁciency
when there is a single dominant individual.
3. MANY INDIVIDUALSAND ONE GOVERNMENT
A more realistic situation is that there are many similar private agents and
only one government. We study this setting under the assumption that all
individuals are identical in their preferences and opportunities, restricting our
attention to analysis of symmetric equilibria (those in which all individuals
choose the same action).
Each individual makes his location action (p = 0o rp = 1), taking
as given the location decisions of all other individuals: we denote the ac-
tion taken by all others as p; the restriction to symmetric equilibria is that
p is also 0 or 1.6
A Committed Government
Suppose that the government can commit to the action d = 0. Then, in view
of Figure 2, the individual agent will choose p = 0. Further, the individual
does not really care what other individuals are doing; it is enough for him to
know that the government will not be building the dam. The individual will
not want to live on the ﬂoodplain if there is no dam.
A Discretionary Government
Matters are more complicated when there is a discretionary government.
Based on our prior discussion and assuming that the government policy is
not inﬂuenced by the actions of an individual agent but only by those of the
average agent, the optimal decision for the government takes the form
d = 0i f p = 0 and (2)
d = 1i f p = 1. (3)
That is, a dam is constructed if people choose to live on the ﬂoodplain, but
not otherwise. This is precisely the same behavior by the discretionary gov-
ernment as in Section 2.
However, the situation for the individual agent is quite different now. He
is playing a simultaneous game with his fellow agents in which the choice
6 Equilibria that are not symmetric are studied in the Appendix.R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 9
variable is location. Although it continues to be the case that it is the ac-
tions of the government that are important for the individual’s location de-
cisions, it is now the behavior of all other agents that determines how the
government acts. The individual has lost his power relative to the case
studied in Section 2.
We can again use Figure 2 to determine how the individual will make his
location decision. We can represent this as
p = 0i f p = 0 because d = 0, and (4)
p = 1i f p = 1 because d = 1, (5)
stressing that governmental response depends on the aggregate private sector
action. Hence, there are two symmetric equilibria under policy discretion.
In one, no individual chooses to locate on the ﬂoodplain and the dam is not
built. In the other, all individuals choose to locate on the ﬂoodplain and the
dam is built. As in Section 2, the equilibrium with ﬂoodplain location and
dambuilding results in lower utility.
Of course, it would be desirable for individuals to coordinate their actions
and for each person to choose p = 0. But, the p = 1, d = 1 example is one
that involves a “coordination failure” in the sense of Cooper and John (1988).
As in the monetary policy analysis of King and Wolman (2004), it is strategic
complementarity that leads to coordination failure, making it optimal for any
single individual to align his location action with those of his fellow citizens.
Further, it is discretionary policy that leads to this strategic complementarity,
as was also true in the monetary policy case.
4. DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSIONS
Working with an example discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977), this
article provides a simple model economy in which there is a single, efﬁcient
equilibrium under commitment and multiple equilibria under discretionary
policymaking. In particular, there are two equilibria that can arise, and one is
clearly worse than the other.
As Kydland and Prescott (1977) suggest, it would be desirable for the
government to pass a law to restrict individual location choices. If no one
was allowed to live on the ﬂoodplain, then it would not matter whether a dam
would be built by the discretionary government if people did live there. Thus,
the model economy displays the property—stressed in the literature on the
Samaritan’s dilemma that begins with Buchanan (1975)—that limitations on
individual choice may be warranted in settings where policymakers lack the
ability to commit their future actions.
The analysis has focused on a government that maximizes the welfare
of the agent, as is natural when all agents are the same. Yet, the tendency
would also arise in more concretely political environments. For example, if10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
agentsareallowedtovoteonwhetheradamshouldbebuiltafter theirlocation
decisions, then it is clear that there would be unanimous support for the dam
if p = 1 and unanimous opposition if p = 0. If individuals were allowed to
vote on a ﬂoodplain prohibition law (of the form suggested by Kydland and
Prescott)beforelocationdecisions,thentherewouldbeunanimoussupportfor
that rule, even though it limited individual choice. That is, the detailed timing
of opportunities for political decisionmaking would be relevant for outcomes
in this economy.
We now understand that there is a potential for a multiplicity of equilib-
rium outcomes in many settings in economic analysis as diverse as monetary
policy and ﬂood control. For positive studies of discretionary policymaking,
this means that there may be previously unstudied equilibrium outcomes. It
ispossible, forexample, thatanextensionoftheanalysisofKingandWolman
(2004)mightbeusedtostudy“inﬂationscares,”asputforwardbyGoodfriend
(1993), in which informational events induce endogenous switches between
low-inﬂation and high-inﬂation equilibria. In terms of the design of institu-
tions for policymaking in discretionary environments, it is necessary to guard
against adverse equilibrium outcomes.R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 11
APPENDIX: GOVERNMENT DECISIONMAKING
The focus of the main text is on a situation in which there are many private
agents and a government that acts in a discretionary manner (taking its dam-
building action after the private sector’s location decision). However, the
text restricts attention to situations in which there are symmetric equilibria
(those with 0 < p<1) so that it is relatively simple to describe government
decisionmaking: it simply acts to maximize welfare as if there was a single
agent. Further, the government is restricted to ﬁnancing the dam (if it builds
one) via lump-sum taxes that are common across all agents.
ThepurposeofthisAppendixistoexplorehowthedam-buildingdecision
foradiscretionarygovernmentisalteredwhenthereisanintermediatefraction
of agents (0 < p<1) that chooses to live on the plain and when there are
otherﬁnancingschemes. Inallsettings,thereisacontinuumofagentsindexed
by i, with 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 that are making the location decision between the plain
and elsewhere (which we will call the hill in thisAppendix).
A1: The Basic Model With Lump-Sum Taxation
In this subsection, we maintain the text assumption that all agents receive a
tax bill equal to dψ. (Each agent pays a lump-sum tax equal to government
expenditure irrespective of his location decision.) In the main text, attention
is restricted to symmetric equilibria so that p = 0o rp = 1, but we now relax
that assumption.
Since we are studying discretionary equilibria, we assume that the gov-
ernment takes p as given and chooses the optimal d. Since agents are hetero-
geneous by location, we assume here that the government maximizes average
utility, pu(cp + b) + (1 − p)u(ch), where cp and ch are the amounts of con-
sumption by plain and hill residents, respectively. In particular, if d = 0, then
the welfare of private agents living on the hill is u(y) and that of those living
on the plain is u(f + b) so that average utility is
pu(f + b) + (1 − p)u(y).
By contrast, if d = 1, then average utility is
pu(y + b − ψ)+ (1 − p)u(y − ψ).
Tounderstandtheoptimalchoiceofthegovernment,considerthefunction
 (p), deﬁnedastheaverageutilitywithadamlesstheaverageutilitywithout
a dam. It is clear that   is linear in p. It is also clear that  (0) = u(y −ψ)−
u(y) < 0, and that  (1) = u(y + b − ψ)− u(f + b) > 0, so that there is a
single value,  p, such that  ( p) = 0.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Hence, for all p< p, then, it is optimal for the government not to build
the dam and for all p> p, it is optimal for the government to build it.
Further, suppose that individual i takes d,p as given and chooses opti-
mally. Then, his optimal strategy is
p = 0i fp< p
p = (0,1) if p =  p
p = 1i fp> p.
If p =  p then agents can be viewed as playing mixed strategies, selecting
a probability of living on the plain of p =  p. Alternatively, some agents
can simply choose to live on the plain while others don’t. But, in any event,
consideration of nonsymmetric equilibria indicates that there is a third equi-
librium possibility not considered earlier. Since individuals are indifferent to
locationwhenp =  p andthegovernmentisindifferentaboutwhethertobuild
the dam or not, then there is a third equilibrium at which p =  p and we are
not able to say whether the dam is built. This particular equilibrium seems
less interesting, as it is “unstable” in a particular sense: if p =  p ± ε, for a
small number ε then it is no longer optimal for an individual to choose the
action required by this equilibrium. It is for this reason that we ignore such
equilibria in the main text.
The consideration of nonsymmetric equilibria also makes it clear that the
Nash equilibria p = 0,d = 0 and p = 1,d = 1 are stable with respect
to changes in behavior by small fractions of the population. If p = ε, the
governmentwouldcontinuetochoosed = 0,andifp = 1−ε,thegovernment
would continue to choose d = 1.
A2: Taxation Just on Floodplain Residents
Suppose,alternatively,thatitispossibletotaxonlyresidentsoftheﬂoodplain,
but not the other residents of the community. This ﬁscal restriction can be
understood in two ways. A direct interpretation is that it is just a particular
positedﬁscalpolicy. Amoresubtleimplicationisthatthegovernmentchooses
this taxation so as to maximize social welfare (as in the next section) subject
to the requirement that it must not lower the welfare of any agent and the
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) + (1 − d)u(f + b).
From the standpoint of these residents, the cost of the dam is now higher
because there is a smaller base of individuals subject to the lump-sum tax.R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 13
Hence, the government will build the dam if









and it will not if p< p. (The value of  p is positive because y>fand
it is less than 1 because y − f>ψ , which is the condition that the dam is
productive if discussed in the main text.) Hence, the government’s decision
rule is again to build a dam if there are many ﬂoodplain residents and to not
build it if there are few. However, relative to the prior case inA1, the “switch
point” for the government has changed.
Importantly, the individual private agent’s location decision is substan-
tially changed by this alternative tax regime. If he remains on the hill, he
gets u(y) while if he moves to the plain he gets something less, irrespective
of whether the dam is built. Hence, no rational agent will ever move to the
ﬂoodplain.
Hence, under discretion with location-speciﬁc lump-sum taxes, the only
Nash equilibrium is the efﬁcient one in which  p = 0 and d = 0. That is, the
change in the structure of taxation has eliminated a “ﬁscal externality” that is
partly responsible for the results in the main text.
A3: Endogenous Taxation
We now consider a discretionary government that chooses the levels of lump-
sumtaxationsoastomaximizetheutilityoftheaverageagentintheeconomy,
taking as given that there is a fraction of agents, p, that lives on the plain. As
above, this average utility is
pu(cp + b) + (1 − p)u(ch),
where cp and ch are the amounts of consumption goods that the government
allocatestoresidentsoftheplainandhill,respectively. Theresourceconstraint
of the economy takes the form
pcp + (1 − p)(ch) ≤ (1 − p)y + p{dy + (1 − d)f − dψ}.
That is, the total amount of consumption must be less than the income earned
by hill and plain residents, net of any cost of dam building.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
A Pareto-optimal allocation mandates that “full” consumption be equated
across plain and hill residents:7
(cp + b) = ch.
Hence, the amount of consumption available for hill residents is given by
ch = pb + y − ψ if d = 1 and
ch = pb + (1 − p)y + pf if d = 0
Accordingly, the government will maximize consumption and welfare by
choosing to build the dam if p> p and not to build the dam if p< p.
The associated taxes by location are
Tp = y − ch − b
Th = y − ch
withtheamountsofconsumption,ch,dependingonthedam-buildingdecision
in ways speciﬁed above.
Confronted with this government ﬁscal policy and dam-building decision
rule, the individual’s behavior is as in the basic model of A1 with lump-sum
taxation but with  p replacing  p: individuals ﬁnd it desirable to locate on the
plain if p> p and to locate on the hill if p< p. Hence, the equilibria are
the same as in the main text.
A4: Comparing the Fiscal Regimes
Looking across the three ﬁscal regimes, we can see that the results of the main
text are broadly sustained, except when the government is required to levy
location-speciﬁc taxes in ways that fully discourage location on the plain. In
terms of the discussion of Kydland and Prescott (1977) quoted in the main
text, the critical point is that the ﬁscal policy cannot be equivalent to passing
a law “prohibiting construction of houses in the ﬂoodplain.” That is, the
ﬁscal regime must not fully punish individuals for the action of locating to the
ﬂoodplain.
7 Effectively, ﬂoodplain residents have consumption equal to c+b, with c being market con-
sumption and b being the consumption value of living on the ﬂoodplain.R.G. King: Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria 15
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